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ARTICLE

WHY I CAN’T BE LIKE MIKE—AT LEAST
WITH RESPECT TO HIS OVERLY BROAD
VIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO ACT ON
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
VIKRAM DAVID AMAR*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In my brief Response (and for various reasons it must be brief) there is
no way I can do full justice to Mike Paulsen’s ambitious, thoughtful, and
provocative Article1 that (as he documents)2 has literally been decades in
the making. Instead, what I hope to do in these pages is to convince readers
that (my version of) the “general academic consensus”3 is not necessarily
“chicken-hearted[ ]”4 nor “incoherent”5 nor “unprincipled.”6 Whether or
not one finds, on balance, my approach to be more attractive than Mike’s is
a somewhat different question, but for present purposes I consider it sufficient to describe the contours of my alternative position in a fair amount of
detail, identify my key premises, and demonstrate that those premises (and
the conclusions I draw from them) are, at a minimum, quite plausible.
* Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I
want to thank members of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal, for their assistance in the
production of this Response essay, and my dear friend Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, for
inviting me to “debate” him—in person and in these pages—as part of the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal’s 2017 symposium on Presidential Executive Power Under the Constitution.
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The President and the Myth of Judicial Supremacy, 14 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 602 (2018).
2. Id. at 603 n.2.
3. Id. at 604.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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LIKE MIKE

Let’s start with areas where Mike and I agree. Both of us deny the idea
that the Supreme Court is the only institution whose constitutional judgment and interpretation matters. We reject the literal and broad understanding of the Court’s language in Cooper v. Aaron7 stating that it “follows
[from Marbury v. Madison8 and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution9]
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court . . . is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution
makes it of binding effect on the States [and presumably other actors] ‘any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.’”10
The Cooper approach—literally equating the U.S. Reports with the
text of the Constitution—“wrongly submerges the meaning of the Constitution itself and improperly elevates the importance of the Justices’ decisions.
In other words, “[it] privileges cases over the Constitution—the doctrine
over the document.”11
Such an approach is refuted by logic, history, and even by Marbury
itself. It was the Constitution, not the Court’s case law, that “We the People” ratified in the 1780s and later through the amendment process. It is the
document that creates the judiciary, not vice versa.
Indeed, the same Constitution that establishes the federal courts
and empowers them to hear cases “arising under this Constitution” requires all judges to swear an oath of allegiance not to their
past rulings, but to the document itself. If neither the executive
nor legislative branch of the federal government may unilaterally
change the meaning of the Constitution, neither should the judiciary be able to do so.
If [I] had to identify precedents supporting this view, [I]
would point first to John Marshall’s fountainhead 1803 opinion in
Marbury, [which] makes clear that the entire basis of judicial review is to ensure compliance with the Constitution itself, as opposed to the misinterpretations of the Constitution by any branch
of government—whether Congress or the president, or the judiciary itself.12
7. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (citing the Supremacy Clause).
11. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How Should the Supreme Court Weigh Its
Own Precedent?, FINDLAW (Dec. 13, 2002), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/howshould-the-supreme-court-weigh-its-own-precedent.html.
12. Id. This, by the way, also explains why the Court was wrong, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to insist that there be some “special
justification” beyond the wrongness of an earlier Court ruling before the Court will overrule itself.
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Mike and I thus fully agree that there is significant room for “constitutional review”—independent of the judiciary’s constitutional interpretations—by the president and other institutions of government. So I concur
with Mike that a president has the power (and indeed the duty) to veto bills
passed by Congress that he thinks violate the Constitution, even if the Court
has made clear it would uphold such measures as constitutionally permissible.13 Similarly, a president can decline to enforce against private persons
laws enacted (over his veto or by prior Congresses) whose enforcement he
feels would violate the Constitution.14 And, again as Mike points out, a
president can use the appointment power to install persons (on the judiciary
or in the executive branch) who have views of the Constitution that diverge
from the Court’s15 and issue pardons for persons who were convicted (or
might be convicted) under laws or circumstances he feels violate the Constitution.16 Indeed, I might list some additional powers/duties a president
has in this regard that Mike undoubtedly agrees with but does not mention.
A president can, in deciding whether and how to enforce a law, read Supreme Court and other judicial precedent narrowly, unless such a reading
(of Supreme Court precedent) is frivolous. He can ignore a particular circuit
court’s precedent (though not nationwide injunctions) he feels wrongly interprets the Constitution, when deciding how to proceed in other circuits.
He can even ignore circuit precedent in that very circuit if there is a reasonable chance he will prevail on the merits of his own constitutional interpretation in the Supreme Court. He can defy Supreme Court precedent he feels
was constitutionally erroneous if he has a non-frivolous belief that either the
passage of time or a change in membership of the Court would lead to a
different result today. And there are other specific acts of his legitimate
independent constitutional interpretative power that it would become tedious to enumerate entirely.17
III.

WHERE MIKE GOES TOO FAR

Here is where Mike and I diverge: I (but not Mike) think that a president MAY NOT defy or ignore an injunction or Supreme Court holding
(that reflects the Court’s current willingness to exercise jurisdiction and its
current view on the merits) that expresses the judiciary’s view that a particular course of affirmative conduct undertaken or contemplated by the president that alters the status quo would violate the Constitution. I don’t know
that any president has actually done this—that is, disregarded constitutional
objections by the Court and gone ahead with action that the Court thinks
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
say, the

Paulsen, supra note 1, at 604.
Id.
Id. at 603–604.
Id. at 604.
Some might involve situations that would never reach the Supreme Court because of,
political question doctrine or other justiciability hurdles.
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would violate the Constitution—but Mike believes such a course of action
would be justified by the president so long as he feels the Court’s constitutional interpretation was wrong.
Why do Mike and I part company here if we both believe the Court’s
word is not the same as the Constitution itself? The key distinction I draw is
between a determination (by any participating branch, not just the Court)
that a proposed course of government action is unconstitutional, versus a
determination (again, by any branch) that the proposed course of action is
constitutionally permissible and even highly desirable.18 My theory of constitutional review is that any one federal branch’s determination that a proposed course of government action would violate the Constitution should
control over any other branch’s determination that the proposed course of
action is permissible and even extremely advisable. My theory erects, in
essence, a one-branch constitutional veto that gives each participating federal government organ an absolute constitutional negative over changes in
the status quo that it feels run afoul of the Constitution.
As I put the point many years ago, the enactment and enforcement of
federal policy routinely
requires more than one federal governmental body to interpret the
Constitution and arrive at a consensus [of constitutional permissibility]. . . . [T]he Constitution generally prefers the status quo if
any one of the involved governmental bodies finds the proposed
action constitutionally unacceptable. For example, in federal legislation, four bodies—the House, Senate, the executive branch
and the federal judiciary—must usually agree that a proposed law
is constitutional before it is enacted and effectively applied. In
effect, each of the four bodies has a constitutional veto.19
Mike rejects my kind of approach, acknowledging that it is in some
respects “attractive,” on the ground that close inspection reveals that “all
legal questions present interests on opposing sides; a ‘stop’ in one direction
and a ‘go’ in the other, and there is no intrinsic right assignment of what
constitutes ‘stopping’ another branch’s actions as opposed to ordering another branch to engage in action.”20 To illustrate his objection, he offers the
following: “Is the holding in Roe v. Wade protective of individual rights to
reproductive freedom or destructive of individual rights to life?”21 Mike’s
invocation of Roe is helpful, because it allows me to sharpen my point so
that Mike (and readers) may see it more clearly.
18. That’s why Mike and I agree on the outcome of the Sedition Act hypothetical in his essay
(which involves a determination by the president that prosecution or punishment would violate
people’s rights), but not on Mike’s broader theory.
19. Vik D. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 Yale L.J. 1111, 1112–1113 (1988).
20. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 606 n.7.
21. Id.
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Assume arguendo that Roe was wrong, and that nothing in the Constitution protects reproductive autonomy. None of that alters the fact that the
Roe Court was making clear its view that Texas’s (it could have been the
president’s—it doesn’t matter for these purposes) proposed course of action
(punishing abortion providers) was constitutionally impermissible, whereas
Texas was arguing (only) that its prosecution of abortion providers was
constitutionally permissible and highly advisable. It may be true, as Mike
suggests, that “all legal questions present interests on opposing sides,”22 but
it is not true that the interests on the opposing sides all take the form of
constitutional rights or immunities. And constitutional freedoms and liberties are—in our system—categorically different from government powers.
In Roe, for example, so far as I know, Texas was not arguing that if it was
not permitted to punish abortion providers, such a situation would itself
violate the Constitution. That is, Texas did not maintain that it had a duty
under the federal Constitution to punish abortion providers, but rather only
that it had the governmental authority to do so. In most settings, any federal
constitutional obligation to regulate would be hard to find, because almost
all powers conferred in the Constitution to the legislative and executive
branches do not impose duties to act.23
Again, the key distinction is between constitutional impermissibility
on the one hand, and permissibility/advisability on the other. When we say
someone’s constitutional rights have been or are going to be violated, we
mean that the unremedied state of affairs will itself violate the Constitution;
by contrast, when the legislature’s efforts to protect individuals’ interests—
even important interests—are blocked by a wrong-headed interpretation of
the Constitution by the judiciary (or by the president for that matter),24 no
one’s constitutional rights have been violated, at least not in the conventional sense in which we use the term “rights.”
Another example (and one that illustrates the fact that my approach
treats courts no better than other branches, at least so far): if the Court finds
that race-based affirmative action is literally necessary to accomplish an
overriding purpose, and is thus not only constitutionally permissible but
highly advisable, but the president (say, in administering federal funds or in
the District of Columbia) concludes that race-based affirmative action violates the Fifth Amendment in all instances, he can (and should) fail to enforce an affirmative action policy enacted by Congress and already upheld
by the Court. And when he does so, just because one branch (the president)
thinks something is constitutionally forbidden that the other branches (Con22. Id.
23. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
24. For example, if a president vetoes a bill because he finds it unconstitutional, and his
constitutional interpretation is wrong (i.e., the government in fact does have the authority to enact
and enforce the bill), no one’s constitutional rights are even arguably violated as a result.
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gress and the Court) think is constitutionally permissible and highly necessary, we don’t say anyone’s constitutional rights are being violated.
Now there may be circumstances (and Mike might think Roe is one of
them)25 where one branch feels an affirmative course of action is not just
constitutionally permissible and advisable, but required by the Constitution
itself (such that inaction is itself a violation of people’s constitutional
rights), and another branch thinks that the proposed course of action is constitutionally forbidden. For example (and maybe Mike’s invocation of Dred
Scott v. Sandford26 foreshadows this kind of question), suppose a president
thinks that a particular state of affairs in existence constitutes slavery and
must be addressed (because unlike almost all the rest of the Constitution,
the Thirteenth Amendment lacks a state action requirement and makes the
very existence of slavery a violation of constitutional rights). Based on this
view, the president embarks on an affirmative course of conduct to eliminate the slavery he perceives. And further suppose that the Court rules that
slavery means something different than the president believes and that the
president’s proposed course of action would violate the Fifth Amendment
rights of affected individuals. In such a situation, then perhaps constitutional push has come to shove, and we may need to decide who wins the tie
(I will come back to this in a moment). But, and this is a crucial point,
Mike’s theory does not limit the president’s power to flout on-point Court
holdings to just these extremely rare (and they are super rare because of the
state action requirement) circumstances in which the president and the
Court, respectively, believe that the other’s preferred state of affairs would
itself violate the Constitution; Mike would permit the president to flout
even when the president does not believe a course of action is itself constitutionally required, but only constitutionally permissible and desirable as a
matter of policy.
Consider, in this regard, the main hypothetical legislation Mike’s Essay introduces—the so-called Sedition Act of 2017.27 Mike and I can agree
that even if the Court were to uphold the (patently unconstitutional) convictions under the Act, the president can and should use his constitutional interpretive powers to refrain from carrying out any sentence (let alone the
death penalty). For Mike, this is a simple, almost generic, example of independent presidential interpretive power. And for me, it is an example of that
power being permissibly exercised because it is in the direction of avoiding
what any one branch (the president) thinks would violate the Constitution.
But, crucially, Mike’s theory—but not mine—would mean that if the Court
were to be the hero in our play, and the one to blow the constitutional
whistle on the Sedition Act, then the president, if he were the wrong-headed
25.
protect
26.
27.

Again, the vast majority of situations in which legislatures do not, or are not permitted to,
existing lives do not violate the Constitution.
See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 606 n.7 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)).
Id. at 610–613.
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one, would be permitted to ignore the Court’s constitutional objections and
execute me and Mike (heaven forbid!) so long as the president’s warped
and crabbed understandings of the First Amendment and Due Process were
consistent with his actions. That is the tough hypothetical that Mike needs
to deal with. The one he offers, by contrast (where the Court has the
broader reading of permissible federal authority), is answered the same way
under both our theories, and thus doesn’t provide an occasion or a reason to
choose between them.
As should be pretty clear from the discussion to this point, my theory
would, as a general matter, treat the Court and the president equally—insofar as each has a veto over affirmative governmental conduct that it thinks
violates the Constitution—but what I have said thus far doesn’t account for
the difficult situation adverted to above when one branch thinks a proposed
course of action is not just permissible and advisable but constitutionally
required, and another branch thinks that such a course is constitutionally
forbidden. Happily, as noted, this situation arises very infrequently, and certainly not often enough to question the application of my theory in the large
run of cases where we lack this kind of crisp constitutional interpretive
conflict.
In instances of a momentous conflict where one branch thinks some
action is constitutionally required and the other thinks the action is constitutionally prohibited, perhaps we don’t need a constitutional tiebreaker, and
we unleash the president the way Mike contemplates. Again, we’re talking
about very rare and limited circumstances in which the president would
have to subjectively believe that the state of affairs the Court thinks is constitutionally required is not only not required, but is itself violative of someone’s constitutional (and not just statutory) liberties. For purposes of this
brief Response essay, I am content to say that perhaps presidents can legitimately defy Court rulings in such circumstances, subject, of course to Congress’s impeachment powers.
But I should note there may also be a decent argument to be made that
in cases like this, the default rule should be to prefer the Supreme Court’s
interpretation. To begin with, as Alexander Hamilton and Alex Bickel both
pointed out,28 the Court has fewer weapons in its arsenal than does the
president, and thus may be less likely to advance adventurous interpretations that it can’t convince the world are correct. Second, contrary to some
of Mike’s arguments,29 not all aspects of the reasoning in Marbury (if that
case be taken of special value) are equally applicable to the president as to
the judiciary. Certainly the requirement of an oath of allegiance to the Con28. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in the Federalist Papers concerning the judiciary’s lack of
the power of the purse or the sword).
29. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 614–616.
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stitution is.30 But when the Court said it is “emphatically” the province of
the judiciary to say what the law is, Chief Justice Marshall might have
rightly had in mind that courts spend all their time on the interpretation of
legal texts, whereas the other branches are part-time legal interpreters. With
experience comes expertise.31 In this vein, as my brother Akhil Amar has
pointed out, there is a clear intratextual parallel between the language conferring jurisdiction on federal courts in Article III and the precise wording
of Article VI making the Constitution the supreme law of the land that
might suggest a distinctive role for courts to interpret the Constitution in
cases and controversies over which they have jurisdiction.32
It is true, as Mike suggests,33 that giving the Court the power to decide
the scope of jurisdiction in controversies before it, and then (in the instance
when it finds an action to be constitutionally required) giving it the power
to command others to act (in violation of their own sense of the Constitution’s limitations) is dangerous. But so too, maybe moreso, is giving the
president the power to decide the scope of his affirmative obligations stemming from the Take Care Clause, and then giving him the power to use the
coercion of the executive branch (which as a practical matter is much larger
than that of the judiciary) to accomplish anything he wants.
IV.

COOPER REDUX?

The final question I should address is why, if I am at least potentially
open to the notion that we ought to prefer the Court to the president when
they think opposing status quos are constitutionally required, we are not
back in the realm of Cooper v. Aaron? The answer is that a distinctive role
(or even an emphatic province) doesn’t equal an exclusive job that crowds
out all others. As Mike and I both point out, many arguments Marbury
makes fully justify meaningful interpretive roles for actors other than the
Court, and this is especially true when we consider, as we must, that the
overall design of the Constitution is one seeking to maximize constitutional
liberty from government coercion even when that makes affirmative
changes to the regulatory status quo quite difficult and cumbersome.34 As I
wrote a while ago:
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
31. This is why, for example, appellate courts might defer to fact-finding of trial courts, even
if social science proves that hearing and seeing testimony live does not help someone discern
honesty any better than does reading a cold transcript.
32. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
33. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 609–610.
34. Consider how conservative (“little c”) the overall design of the Constitution’s lawmaking
procedures are: thirty-five of the five hundred and thirty-six elected federal officials (that is, the
president and thirty-four senators) can (by a veto that cannot be overridden) stymie the legislative
wishes of the other five hundred and one elected participants in the lawmaking process who seek
to change the status quo.
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If we were choosing one body to interpret the Constitution and minimize the sum of error costs (i.e. costs of upholding unconstitutional [government action] and costs of striking down constitutional[ly permissible
government action]), we might very well choose the institution with the
most expertise. But the Constitution is not neutral as between these two
types of costs. By setting up successive screens, the Constitution effectively
favors the narrowest reading of federal power that any one branch might
have. For this reason, absent extraordinary circumstances, each branch must
follow its own constitutional interpretation.35

35. Amar, supra note 19, at 1123 n.65. As I did then, let me repeat the words of Hamilton in
Federalist 73 on this point: “The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those
errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the
contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable that culpable views of any
kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same
object than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them. . . . The injury which
may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage
of preventing a number of bad ones.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443–444 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

